Slowdown in Economic Growth in GDP Growth in 2009

In Q4 2008, economy expanded 5.3%, slowest pace since Q4 2003, (Q3 2008: 7.6%, Q2 2008: 7.9%) due to contracting manufacturing (-0.2%), agriculture (-2.2%) and exports

Growth forecasts revised down: 2008: 7.8% (IMF), 7.4% (ADB), RBI: 7.5%; Govt: 7.1%, i-banks: 5.6-8%, RGE Monitor: 6%. Forecast for 2009: 7.1% (govt); 5.1% (IMF); 7% (ADB); I-banks: 4.3-6.3%, RGE Monitor: 5%

Since December 2008 Govt and central bank have been giving fiscal stimulus package aimed at non-bank financial corporations, infrastructure, housing, SMEs, exporters; reducing taxes, easing credit access. Since September 2008: Central bank continues inject liquidity, ease capital inflows and cut policy rates. Further rate cuts and credit easing, and fiscal stimulus expected in 2009 though close to 10% of GDP of fiscal deficit will limit the latter

Growth, capital expenditure and consumer spending in 2007/08 was fueled by global growth and liquidity boom, capital inflows and asset bubbles. But global credit crunch, risk aversion and Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) sell-off have severely affected domestic liquidity for banks, stock market and real estate correction, bank lending to finance consumer spending and investment. Domestic slowdown will aggravate asset market correction during 2009 and put bank performance at risk

Consumers hit by high inflation, tight lending standards, job losses, slower income growth, negative wealth effect from correction in stock and home prices

Recent boom in capital expenditure (37% of GDP) is being hit as manufacturing and industrial production are declining since December 2008; several investment projects are being canceled/postponed due to capital crunch; corporate earnings have also taken a hit since Q4 2008 on slowing domestic demand, tighter credit, volatile stock market and drying Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), global liquidity crunch that is limiting access to external finance (major source of capital); corporate savings will run down domestic savings while government runs a deficit

External Sector: Exports have been contracting since late-2008 since major export markets (US and EU) are in recession and high growth markets (Asia, Middle-East) are slowing. Financial sector woes in the West are affecting IT service exports. Vulnerability to trade and current account deficits (expected to exceed 10% and 3% of GDP respectively) on high oil import bill of 2008, contracting exports, slowing remittances from the West and Gulf. These factors pose risk to the current account while slowdown in capital inflows (FII outflow, easing FDI on risk aversion, global liquidity crunch) poses risk of financing external deficit. These factors have pushed rupee to a 5-yr low

Food and oil subsidies, pre-election and fiscal stimulus spending are expected to push fiscal deficit to 10% of GDP in FY ending Mar 2009 and over 9% in FY ending Mar 2010; S&P and Fitch have cut ratings to 'negative'. This may raise govt debt issues to over US$70 billion in 2009 raise interest rate and depress bond prices,putting risk of financing twin deficits at a time when capital inflows are already drying up

What others are saying

JP Morgan: Targeted 7.1% GDP growth in 2009 by government would not achievable, since fiscal packages in December 2008 and January 2009 and monetary easing in late-December 2008 need 6 or 9 months to show up in the growth rate

IMF: Significant downside risks to GDP growth in 2008 (6.3%) and 2009 (5.3%) but government measures could be an upside though constrained by the fiscal deficit and large public debt, thereby increasing dependence on monetary policy

Citi: While trend in auto, cement, steel and retail sales in February 2008 expected to be positive, real estate, freight and port traffic as well as march data are still worrisome; hard to achieve 7.1% growth in 2009 

EIU: 7.1% growth in 2009 targeted by government is overly optimistic; Global deleveraging and risk aversion will limit the availability of financing for investment and consumption, which will increase the pain on industrial and services sectors; Despite of struggling by govt. to create enough jobs for labor force, number of unemployed workers would increase (500,000 jobs were lost in Oct-Dec-08); It will play the important role for election in April-09  

Deloitte: India economy has been impacted by four different ways; weak manufacturing, falling exports, revenues of software companies and closing credit tap in banking sector

Morgan Stanley: Recent growth trend above sustainable levels was driven by capital inflows. Stimulus measures won't prevent a deeper slowdown in domestic demand, cost of capital, industrial production and exports

Kotak: India in a two-year cyclical slowdown with slowing saving and investment, but this phase may be short and shallow unless the global economy deteriorates more than expected. But new capacities in mining coming on-stream, large consumption stimulus, high domestic saving base will help sustain reasonable growth. The sharp deterioration in activity Q4 2008 may have got arrested in Jan 2009; fiscal package too small to sustain the current investment and growth cycle and is constrained by fiscal deficit; monetary stimulus will help reduce interest rates but pace of rate cuts will ease

Goldman Sachs :growth will reach a trough in Apr-Jun-09  before recovering by end-FY10; Stimulus would support specific sectors amid the downturn but not enough to reduce impact of slowdown on aggregate demand

WEF: Dependence on capital flows to finance current a/c deficit is a risk; global crisis could cause sharp capital outflows, fall in share and asset prices, reduction in availability of finance

 

Please do leave your comments. Would like to hear from your perspective also.

India's Stock Market in a Bear Market Rally?

 

On March 26 2009 Sensex rose to a 2 month high crossing the 10,000 mark on easing inflation and U.S. market rally.

In spite of some stabilization from 2008 trends, Sensex had fallen 12.65% in 2009 as of mid-March as risk aversion and FII outflows continue. Top10 firms lost over $4 bn from their market capitalization in Feb 2009. Stock market fell over 56% in 2008 from the Jan-08 peak making it one of the worst performing markets among Asia, BRICs and EMs

Stock market will face further risks in 2009 as investor sentiment will continue to trend down amid significant slowdown in GDP growth, domestic demand, lower corporate earnings, political uncertainty, increasing terrorist activities, sharp depreciation of Indian rupee and expected future weakness against USD, and lower dividends forecast for 2009 (on global liquidity crunch, contracting industrial activity though easing commodity prices related cost of production is a plus). Slowing IPOs, capital raising activity by firms is affecting their expansion plans. This will weigh down on investment in 2009 and further flight out of foreign capital from Indian markets

FIIs have sold over $1.8 bn in 2009 as of mid-March and $13 bn in 2008 (after buying $17 bn investment in 2007) and their share in BSE-500 Companies (which a/c for a large share in market cap) has also declined; this is causing rupee depreciation, depletion of forex reserves

Valuations have shown significant correction as P/E ratios are down from a high of 28 in early 2008 to ~9 in early Feb 2009, and are also cheap in terms of  bond/equity yield gap, market cap/GDP relative. But given that corporate earnings will ease further and risks to the corporate sector are to the downside in 2009 on demand slowdown and credit crunch, valuations might fall further making an attractive buying opportunity by end-2009 or early-2010

Q4 2008: Profits for top line of 595 companies grew 17% from 35% in Q3 2008. The bottom line saw net profit fall 21.1% on lower realization for commodities, marked-to-market losses on derivatives exposures and high finance charge

Energy stocks (losses of oil companies), real estate (slowing capital inflows, housing correction), auto (slowing demand), banking (defaults), tech (slowing IT exports), cement, metals, finance along with retail investors have taken a hit

Again, what others are saying have also been quoted. They are as follows:

Stock market regulator: FIIs are lending and borrowing overseas by using offshore derivatives (P-notes) to short sell in the market

UBS : India's benchmark stock index would rise though FY2009/10 due to relative cheap price in March 2009 compare to other markets; Index will increases  as extending a bull market in anticipation of of a recovery in earnings

HSBC :Cheaper valuation, government stimulus plans as well as government pumps about US$ 100billion would rebound stock market; rupee's depreciation again U.S. dollar in 2008 would make overseas investors to attract India's stock market in 2009

Kotak (via bloomberg): Market was already expected the rate cut, the fear now is that govt are running out of measures that they can use to stimulate economy

Fundsupermart: still cautious on India as earnings might slow down further and market is still expensive compared to other Asian markets

Goldman Sachs : Further fall in markets, FII holdings expected as less favorable macro outlook and corporate earnings don't support the high equity valuations

Indian Economy in a Deflationary Mode. Will the Central Bank Continue to Cut rates?

The world is running in circles with this financial crisis that has got all tangled into it without leaving anyone. I know for many this is still a recession stage, but many of the facts point to us that all are in early stage of depression or last stage of recession. But as far as any economy is concerned, all are pointing towards downward growth and India is no exception. Indian economy is in a deflationary mode, but the question is whether central bank will continue to cut rates?

• Easing Inflation: Wholesale Price Index (WPI) slowed to 0.27% (lowest in 33 years) in the week ending March 14 2009 from 0.44% in the week ending March 7 2009 (lowest level in two decades). 2008's base effects, slowing food and fuel prices (fuel price cut in December 2008), commodities, power due to global recession and domestic demand slowdown led the fall in the WPI. But Consumer Price Index (CPI) hasn't eased much compared to WPI (8-11% in mid-March 2009).
• Inflation outlook: While WPI might turn negative by March-end/April on easing supply-side factors, CPI might remain high until late-2009 and might slow only as demand eases. This might constrain rate cuts by RBI. Further cut in fuel prices expected which along with recent cuts in excise and service taxes will drive down inflation further. Credit growth has slowed to 19.6% y/y by mid-Jan 2009. Good agriculture harvest also a positive. Deflationary pressures might continue until the end of 2009
• Mar 4: RBI cut interest rate to 5% from 5.5% (5th time since Oct 2008); reduced reverse repurchase rate to 3.5% from 4% as growth slowed to 5.3% in Q4 2008 along with contracting exports, slowing investment and bank lending. Rate cuts are aimed to provide domestic and FX liquidity, improve credit growth
• Jan 2009: Cash Reserve Ratio(CRR) (5%) unchanged after cutting rates aggressively since late-2008. But RBI extended the special refinance facility and short-term repo facility for banks to meet the funding requirements of MFs, NBFCs and HFCs up to Sep 2009
• Central Bank: "While financial markets continue to function in an orderly manner, India’s growth trajectory has been impacted both by global financial crisis and downturn much deeper and wider than anticipated with declining WPI. Banks should monitor loan portfolio to prevent asset impairment, price risk appropriately but continue to lend to creditworthy enterprises"
• Room to cut rates further since growth forecasts will be revised down amid contracting exports and industrial production (real estate, construction, auto, consumer durables) and slowing capital expenditure and consumer spending, cooling labor market and wage pressures. Aggressive monetary stimulus needs to complement the fiscal stimulus (whose size is constrained by fiscal deficit). Inflation is also trending down sharply giving room for more rate cuts to prevent negative real rates. In spite of liquidity injections, global credit crunch, capital outflows and central bank's foreign exchange interventions are keeping liquidity tight. This is affecting private sector's access to credit as bank lending rates haven't eased much and lending standards to firms and consumers have become stringent. Household and firms' bank Non Performing Assets (NPAs) are rising
• Risks of easing rates: Will exacerbate capital outflows and rupee decline. interbank rates have eased since Q4-08; Will not be sufficient to offset the pull back in private domestic demand in 2009. Banks are also reluctant to cut rates too low, and lend to risky sectors like auto, real estate and are instead preferring to park funds in govt bonds. Aggressive rate cuts, liquidity injection and currency depreciation poses inflation risk during recovery in an economy with structurally strong domestic demand
• Since Oct 2008's liquidity squeeze, spike in overnight call and inter-bank rates and slowing domestic demand, RBI has aggressively cut rates (first time in over 4 years), reducing the amount banks are required to invest in govt bonds to 24% from 25%, easing credit cost and conditions for restructuring loans directed towards small and medium enterprises (SMEs), corporate sector and housing sector, injecting liquidity into banking system, buying back govt bonds, improving credit access to banks, investors, Mutual Funds, easing capital inflows, FX intervention by RBI to contain rupee slide

What others say

• Citi: further interest rate cut or reductions in CRR in April 2009 is expected due to given high fiscal deficits, limited fiscal space, weak macro data, and lowering inflation rate 
• EIU: deflationary impact of global recession and easing commodity prices will persist till 2009-end; central bank is expected to cut interest rate further in Q1 2009
• Kotak: Near-zero WPI may not lead RBI to cut rates since CPI is still high. But quantitative easing by the Fed may lead RBI to step up its open market purchases against large fiscal borrowings but it will still resist private placement of government debt on its balance sheet
• Goldman Sachs: WPI to enter a period of deflation from April until end-2009 due continuing demand destruction and large base effects from 2008. Central bank could cut cash reserve ratio for banks by mid-2009 to provide liquidity but might not cut interest rate further until end of general election in
• Nomura (not Online): Central Bank would cut interest rates in April and June due to soft transmission of stimulus to economy
• DBS: Deterioration in growth is main reason of rate cut; further rate cut expected by April 2009 
• Morgan Stanley: RBI's easing will reduce systemic risks in banking system but won't renew business and consumer sentiment in near-term

CNBC you have to report TRUTH… FIX CNBC!!

If the Jon Stewart vs. Jim Cramer fiasco wasn’t enough to convince you that some content changes are due at CNBC, I’m not sure what will.

As I’ve said a few times here at SF and around the blogosphere, the CNBC we have today isn’t the CNBC that I knew 10 years ago as people say it to me.  There is a larger focus on sensationalism and talking heads debating themselves rather than reporting business news.

I’m not a believer that over the top debates and guest speakers arguing with seasoned reporters is proper etiquette for a business network.

I have been telling people that over the past 2-3 years, that what is being reported in the television are not the truth and its just a window dressing to fool or exploit all of us as we think they know everything and we don’t know anything. Well, I think now atleast people will start giving a year to my thoughts with JON STEWART bringing out the truth through humor and his comedy to the public.

If you feel the same way, or just want to put a warning shot across their bow, please consider signing the FixCNBC.com petition.

If getting called out for their lack of ethics by a channel who’s most notable show contains 4 foul-mouthed 4th graders (aka - Southpark), then maybe a petition of a few hundred thousand disgrunted viewers can shake things up a bit.

Treasury Officials Who Missed $8 Trillion Housing Bubble Still Haven't Noticed It

If the NYT description of the Treasury Department's bank rescue plan is accurate, then this should have been the headline to the article. The article reports that the Treasury Department is confident that it will not lose money by buying mortgage backed securities at far above their market price because: "the government can hold those mortgages as long as it wants, officials are betting the government will be repaid and that taxpayers may even earn a profit if the market value of the loans climbs in the years to come."

House prices are currently falling at more than a 20 percent annual rate. If they fall another 20 percent in real terms, they will be back at their trend level. A further 20 percent decline will hugely increase the percentage of mortgages that are underwater, reducing the value of mortgage backed securities from their current level. There is no obvious reason that house prices should then again rise above their trend level.

The failure of people like Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner to recognize the $8 trillion housing bubble led to this crisis. It appears as though they somehow still don't understand it. This fact should have been the headline of the news article since their continued failure to undersatnd the housing market could cost taxpayers trillions of dollars and further damage the economy.

NYTimes ignores protectionism for banks

If the U.S. government were to hand checks for tens of billions of dollars to the domestic auto industry or the steel industry to help them survive, presumably it would be viewed as a form of protectionism. However, when the checks to the banking industry, for some reason the question of protectionism never arises.

The NYT had a front page story warning of the rise of protectionism. Remarkably, it makes no mention of the hundreds of billions of dollars that the U.S. government is paying to keep the financial industry afloat. All the claims about the inefficiencies of protectionism apply as much to banking as they do to the auto and steel sector (we can use the same graph for all three), however protectionism for the banks never seems to raise any concerns in the media.

Is the U.S. Government Insolvent?

 

Given the economic situation at hand, the word "insolvent" might be nominated as Word of the Year (2008, 2007). However, given all the attention to that word -- which basically means one is unable to cover financial obligations -- I'm not sure why more people aren't a little more concerned about the idea that our government itself may be, in effect, insolvent, and becoming more so every day.

Consider the trillions committed for economic stimulus and bailout purposes. We already owe trillions (including $1 trillion to China). Recall that private enterprise, real estate, and consumer spending all bring in the tax revenues that the government requires to fund its initiatives if it had a balanced budget. Needless to say, tax income is dwindling as the economy stumbles and teeters on the brink of even more serious damage.

And yet the government is committed to spending even more, which means borrowing more and/or firing up the printing presses, making some decisions that could cripple many businesses and drive some overseas -- not to mention hurt already beleaguered consumers. Anybody who realizes money doesn't grow on trees or get delivered by storks (in the case of trillions, flocks of storks I guess, or maybe Monsanto's (NYSE: MON) working on genetically modified super storks) should be very concerned.

Same economic story, different administration

For what it's worth, expanding government, spending taxpayer money, and digging us into a huge debt hole for defense spending is most certainly not "better" than expanding government, spending taxpayer money, and digging us into a huge debt hole for social programs that likely won't result in real, long-term economic growth. I find war spending far more odious, but neither should come to pass, especially with the kind of fiscal black hole U.S government has been digging with a Keynesian shovel -- although admittedly, even John Maynard Keynes didn't condone governments indulging in deficit spending in supposedly good times like the Bush administration did.

Last year's documentary I.O.U.S.A., which featured well-known people in government and business like Alan Greenspan, Paul Volcker, Ron Paul, and Berkshire Hathaway's  Warren Buffett, pointed to an overburdened and unsustainable situation even before all the bailout madness really picked up steam. The National Debt Clockran out of numbers, folks. That was meant to be a wakeup call: We were already over our heads!

Of course, people can argue all they want about "this guy versus that guy," and why "we shouldn't question this new guy's economic policies because he's so much better than the last guy," or "this political party's my political party so they're OK no matter what," and "gee, do we ever hate those other guys!" Maybe some people find all that team mentality as comforting as six-packs and Monday Night Football, but I think it's all a silly distraction that distracts people from thinking about the real issues. And as far as I can tell, what the real issue is: Where's the money, and where's more of it going to come from?

Beyond the banks
Many people are already well aware of the fears that huge banks like Citigroup Bank of America, and Wells Fargo up to their eyeballs in risky loans that are rapidly defaulting are basically insolvent. Meanwhile, the consumer climate makes dying dinosaurs like General Motors even sicker, and of course its own debt load's nothing to sneeze at.

But all that's child's play when you ponder our government's cash burn and burgeoning obligations.

The $3.6 trillion budget President Obama recently spearheaded includes a near-term deficit of a mind-blowing $1.75 trillion. While he vows that the deficit will be halved later, that seems built upon some rather rosy economic recovery projections coming to pass, and if industries become increasingly beleaguered (and businesses provide jobs and tax revenues, folks), then I think you can see why this might present a problem down the road.

Meanwhile, the National Debt is currently just under $11 trillion and growing. You can't just keep adding debt while GDP declines, and raising taxes will strangle already beleaguered businesses and citizens. The Federal Reserve is firing up the printing presses, but that brings to mind the very real risk of hyperinflation.

Last but not least, I hope nobody missed the fact that last week China expressed concerns about the U.S. being good for its debt to that country. If that doesn't scare you -- and support the thesis that there is major reason for concern -- I don't know what will. Meanwhile, France and Germany balked at spending for their own stimulus plans. Um, hello?

Fasten your seatbelts
Unfortunately, the government's overheated spending, relying on future revenues and of course, that of future generations, reminds me a little too much of the Ponzi scheme mentality. And if entrepreneurship and business suffers, then our economy will be awfully close to a Ponzi scheme, where money is simply handed around without any real productive enterprise going on. Only this time it's going to include ugly side effects like worthless greenbacks resulting from out-of-control inflation. (And the Fed's $1 trillion move yesterday certainly stirs up still more concerns about runaway inflation even if the stock market did rise on the news.)

And of course, things could most certainly get far worse from there.

I know this sounds harsh, but I'm a proponent of trying to recognize the truth instead of fighting to stay in a state of overly optimistic delusion. I'm not stuffing cash in my mattress or giving up on the idea of investing; I try to remind myself that panic is destructive, not constructive, and won't help our current situation.

Yet I do believe there are grave issues at hand that we should contemplate, which could most certainly change the way we invest, not to mention the way we live.

And one of them is, is the U.S. Government insolvent? Feel free to comment in the comment boxes below, but I fear the road to real economic recovery is looking awfully rocky -- fasten your seatbelts, it's going to be a bumpy ride.

Why successful bank rescue is far away?

I am becoming ever more worried. I never expected much from the Europeans or the Japanese. But I did expect the US, under a popular new president, to be more decisive than it has been. Instead, the Congress is indulging in a populist frenzy; and the administration is hoping for the best.

If anybody doubts the dangers, they need only read the latest analysis from the International Monetary Fund.* It expects world output to shrink by between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent this year and the economies of the advanced countries to shrink by between 3 and 3.5 per cent. This is unquestionably the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s.

One must judge plans for stimulating demand and rescuing banking systems against this grim background. Inevitably, the focus is on the US, epicentre of the crisis and the world’s largest economy. But here explosive hostility to the financial sector has emerged. Congress is discussing penal retrospective taxation of bonuses not just for the sinking insurance giant, AIG, but for all recipients of government money under the troubled assets relief programme (Tarp) and Andrew Cuomo, New York State attorney-general, seeks to name recipients of bonuses at assisted companies. This, of course, is an invitation to a lynching.

Yet it is clear why this is happening: the crisis has broken the American social contract: people were free to succeed and to fail, unassisted. Now, in the name of systemic risk, bail-outs have poured staggering sums into the failed institutions that brought the economy down. The congressional response is a disaster. If enacted these ideas would lead to an exodus of qualified employees from US banks, undermine willingness to expand credit, destroy confidence in deals struck with the government and threaten the rule of law. I presume legislators expect the president to save them from their folly. That such ideas can even be entertained is a clear sign of the rage that exists.

This is also the background for the “public/private partnership investment programme” announced on Monday by the US Treasury secretary, Tim Geithner. In the Treasury’s words, “using $75bn to $100bn in Tarp capital and capital from private investors, the public/private investment programme will generate $500bn in purchasing power to buy legacy assets – with the potential to expand to $1 trillion over time”. Under the scheme, the government provides virtually all the finance and bears almost all the risk, but it uses the private sector to price the assets. In return, private investors obtain rewards – perhaps generous rewards – based on their performance, via equity participation, alongside the Treasury.

I think of this as the “vulture fund relief scheme”. But will it work? That depends on what one means by “work”. This is not a true market mechanism, because the government is subsidising the risk-bearing. Prices may not prove low enough to entice buyers or high enough to satisfy sellers. Yet the scheme may improve the dire state of banks’ trading books. This cannot be a bad thing, can it? Well, yes, it can, if it gets in the way of more fundamental solutions, because almost nobody – certainly not the Treasury – thinks this scheme will end the chronic under-capitalisation of US finance. Indeed, it might make clearer how much further the assets held on longer-term banking books need to be written down.

Why might this scheme get in the way of the necessary recapitalisation? There are two reasons: first, Congress may decide this scheme makes recapitalisation less important; second and more important, this scheme is likely to make recapitalisation by government even more unpopular.

If this scheme works, a number of the fund managers are going to make vast returns. I fear this is going to convince ordinary Americans that their government is a racket run for the benefit of Wall Street. Now imagine what happens if, after “stress tests” of the country’s biggest banks are completed, the government concludes – surprise, surprise! – that it needs to provide more capital. How will it persuade Congress to pay up?

The danger is that this scheme will, at best, achieve something not particularly important – making past loans more liquid – at the cost of making harder something that is essential – recapitalising banks.

This matters because the government has ruled out the only way of restructuring the banks’ finances that would not cost any extra government money: debt for equity swaps, or a true bankruptcy. Economists I respect – Willem Buiter, for example – condemn this reluctance out of hand. There is no doubt that the decision to make whole the creditors of all systemically significant financial institutions creates concerns for the future: something will have to be done about the “too important to fail” problem this creates. Against this, the Treasury insists that a wave of bankruptcies now would undermine trust in past government promises and generate huge new uncertainties. Alas, this view is not crazy.

I fear, however, that the alternative – adequate public sector recapitalisation – is also going to prove impossible. Provision of public money to banks is unacceptable to an increasingly enraged public, while government ownership of recapitalised banks is unacceptable to the still influential bankers. This seems to be an impasse. The one way out, on which the success of Monday’s plan might be judged, is if the greater transparency offered by the new funds allowed the big banks to raise enough capital from private markets. If that were achieved on the requisite scale – and we are talking many hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions – the new scheme would be a huge success. But I do not believe that pricing legacy assets and loans, even if achieved, is going to be enough to secure this aim. In the context of a global slump, will investors be willing to put up the vast sums required by huge and complex financial institutions, with a proven record of mismanagement? Trust, once destroyed, cannot so swiftly return.

The conclusion, alas, is depressing. Nobody can be confident that the US yet has a workable solution to its banking disaster. On the contrary, with the public enraged, Congress on the war-path, the president timid and a policy that depends on the government’s ability to pour public money into undercapitalised institutions, the US is at an impasse.

It is up to Barack Obama to find a way through. When he meets his group of 20 counterparts in London next week, he will be unable to state he has already done so. If this is not frightening, I do not know what is.

The root cause of the financial crisis: a demand-side view- Photis Lysandrou

The financial sector is widely blamed for the financial crisis, with banks and their investment vehicles considered responsible for the products at its epicentre.

By contrast, investors who bought these products are seen as having played a largely passive role. In fact, demand-side pressures were the main driving force behind the growth of these products. As a result, governments will be unable to prevent crises if they restrict themselves to changing the global financial architecture.

The scale of demand for securities (see appendix, table1) helps to explain the fall in treasury yields and the tightening of yield spreads after 2001. Psychological factors are typically invoked to account for these developments: infected by the atmosphere of optimism and confidence in the real economy, investors also became over-confident and hence overly willing to accept lower risk premiums. However, it is more likely that yields fell after 2001 mainly because governments and large corporations were unable to supply securities with a sufficient wealth storage capacity to accommodate the surplus capital pools.

Without any one of the main components of the global demand for securities, yields would not have fallen as far as they did; nor would the ‘search for yield’ phenomenon have become as pronounced as it did.

The question is: which demand component can we subtract? That exercised by the institutional investors? Or by the banks? Or by governments? In each case, there is justification or plausible explanation for the size of the demand for securities that was exercised.

However, this hardly applies to the high net worth individuals, of whom there were 9.5m in 2006. HNWIs may have had little or no direct involvement in the collateralised debt obligations market, but their indirect involvement was substantial in that they were the leading providers of finance to hedge funds (see appendix, figure 1). These hedge funds were in turn the leading buyers of CDOs (see appendix, figure 2).

This last fact is easily explained. The basic task of hedge funds is to generate above average returns for their clients, for which these clients pay above average fees. This task became increasingly difficult in the low-yield environment of the early to mid- 2000s. The problem was that no matter how sophisticated were the investment strategies used to generate yield, there were limits to how much could be squeezed out of the securities and other available asset classes. So the hedge funds found themselves in a dilemma: on the one hand, more and more assets were placed under their management because other investors were finding it difficult to generate yield; on the other hand, the hedge funds were themselves finding it difficult to generate yield.

It was hedge funds’ need to resolve this dilemma that led them to the search for alternative financial products that could give higher yields, and, when finding that the CDOs fitted this description, led the demand for them. Hedge funds pressured suppliers into providing these products at an ever-increasing rate. As Gerald Corrigan, a managing director of Goldman Sachs, told British MPs recently: “To a significant degree it has been the reach for yield on the part of institutional investors in particular that goes a considerable distance in explaining this very rapid growth of structured credit products”.

Financial crises will not be avoided merely by reforming the financial system. Regulators can make the system as transparent and accountable as they like, but as long as there remain external pressures on it to create products or to indulge in harmful practices, such products and practices will continue to be introduced and financial crises will continue.

Only a significant re-distribution of wealth will remove these external pressures. This requires globally coordinated action in three areas of tax policy:

(1) Tax havens: these need to be closed to prevent trillions of dollars from disappearing off governments’ radar screens;

(2) Tax structures: these need to be harmonised to prevent mobile sections of global capital from encouraging a tax competition ‘race to the bottom’ with the result that domestic tax burdens fall on those who cannot operate across borders;

(3) Tax rates: these need to be re-aligned so that the tax burden is again distributed on a progressive rather than regressive basis.

A globalised version of Keynesianism is needed to help to prevent future crises and to help finance the resolution to the present one. As governments pile more claims on their future revenues through bond issuance, the lower will be their credit ratings and the higher will be the risk-adjusted returns that investors will demand.

From where will these returns come? Since there are limits to how much can be raised from average income households, small businesses and other immobile taxable units, there will have to be, in the absence of serious tax reforms, deep cuts in many areas of government expenditure.

It will be difficult for governments to institute the necessary tax reforms, and thus prevent them from making those cuts, given the pressure exercised by the very wealthy.

However, it can be done providing strong countervailing pressure is brought to bear on governments. If ever there was occasion and opportunity to exercise that countervailing pressure, it is now.

Photis Lysandrou is professor of global political economy, London Metropolitan Business School, London Metropolitan University

Appendix: Table 1

Major Holders of Securities, 2006 (US $Trillions)	Total Assets	Securities	Alternative Investments (inc. Hedge funds)	Other Assets (cash, real estate, etc.)
1. Institutional Investors
(a) PFs	21.6	17.3	1.3	3
(b) MFsÂ	19.3	17.4	0.8	1.1
(c) IC's	18.5	14.8	1.1	2.6
2. Banks	74.4	37.2
3. Governments
(a) Reserves	5.4	4.9	0	0.5
(b) SWFs	1.9	1.5	0.2	0.2
4. HNWIs	37.2	19.3	3.7	14.1

References

Bank of England (2008), Financial Stability Report, October
Capgemini (2007), 11th World Wealth Report, June
Conference Board (2008), Institutional Investment Report, September
House of Commons (2008), Treasury Committee, Report on Financial Stability and Transparency, 26th February, 2008,
International Monetary Fund (2008), Global Financial Stability Report, April
McKinsey Global Institute (2008), Mapping Global Capital Markets: Fourth Annual Report, January
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008), Asset Comparison -Investor Classes and Asset Classifications, August

What is LIBOR?

I recently thought that i had an in-depth idea of LIBOR. But then, all of a sudden i was put into the fray and I learnt that it was only 0.1% of the entire concept I knew. For this, I thank my faculty of International Finance of my college( Mr. Chandrashekhar – amazingly brilliant ) who gave me a better perspective of the topic and now after going through various documents, articles, books and sites I have compiled it to a simple article.

In this article I'll explain a little understood yet extremely relevant financial tool used across the globe: the London Interbank Offered Rate(LIBOR).

Then what Is LIBOR?
LIBOR is equivalent to the federal funds rate, or the interest rate one bank charges another for a loan. The advent of LIBOR can be traced to 1984, when the British Bankers Association (BBA) sought to add proper trading terms to actively traded markets, such as foreign currency,forward rate agreements and interest rate swaps. LIBOR rates were first used in financial markets in 1986 after test runs were conducted in the previous two years. Today, LIBOR has reached such stature that the rate is published daily by the BBA at about 11:45am GMT.
LIBOR's reach is felt thousands of miles away from the Thames; it is used as the key point of reference for financial instruments, such as futures contracts, the U.S. dollar, interest rate swaps and variable rate mortgages. LIBOR takes on added significance in times of tight credit as foreign banks yearn for U.S. dollars. This scenario usually sends LIBOR for dollars soaring, which is generally a sign of imminent economic peril.

The Reach of LIBOR
LIBOR is set by 16 international member banks and, by some estimates, places rates on a staggering $360 trillion of financial products across the globe. Included in those products are adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). In periods of stable interest rates, LIBOR ARMs can be attractive options for homebuyers. These mortgages have no negative amortization and, in many cases, offer fair rates for prepayment. The typical ARM is indexed to the six-month LIBOR rate plus 2-3%.

LIBOR's reach doesn't end with the homeowner. The rate is also used to calculate rates for small business loans, student loans and credit cards. More often than not, LIBOR's heavy hand isn't felt directly by homeowners or others in need of a loan. When the U.S. interest rate environment is stable and the economy flourishes, all is usually well with LIBOR. Unfortunately, there is another side to that coin. During times of economic uncertainty, especially in developed countries, LIBOR rates show signs of excessive volatility, making it harder for banks to make and receive loans among each other. That problem is passed down to people seeking loans from the bank. If cash is scarce or at a premium for your local bank, the bank simply charges you, the borrower, a higher interest rate, or worse, doesn't loan you the money at all.

If Times Are Bad, Watch LIBOR
Another prominent trait of LIBOR is that it can dilute the effects of Fed rate cuts. Most investors think it's great when the Fed cuts rates, or at least they welcome the news. If LIBOR rates are high, the Fed cuts look a lot like taking a vacation to Hawaii and getting rain every day. High LIBOR rates restrict people from getting loans, making a lower Fed discount rate a nonevent for the average person. If you have a subprime mortgage, you need to watch LIBOR rates with a close eye as almost $1 trillion in subprime ARMs are indexed to LIBOR.

While LIBOR action in relation to the foreign exchange markets pertains more to currencies, such as the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and others, its daily impact on the value of the dollars spent in the United States is negligible, though it is worth noting that LIBOR is very relevant to rates on the euro, or U.S. dollars held by foreign banks. The euro accounts for roughly 20% of total dollar reserves.

Bottom Line
LIBOR isn't sexy, and it's doubtful anyone is looking forward to the next release of LIBOR data with the same anticipation of seeing the next James Bond movie. That said, anyone with a credit card or a desire to own a home needs to be of aware of LIBOR. LIBOR is the true British monarchy, at least for the global financial markets - and your personal bottom line.

Spanish doldrums – Paul Krugman

This is an article written by Paul Krugman which i felt is necessary to share. So read through this and leave your comments.

“I’m in Yurp for a week, spending some time on other peoples’ problems (although in a way it’s all part of the same problem.) And one has to say that Europe has gotten itself into one heck of a mess, worse even than ours — because they have intractable adjustment problems on top of the general crisis.

The poster child for these adjustment problems is Spain, where I’m currently sitting.

For much of the past decade, Spain had a huge construction boom, financed by vast inflows of capital:

Now that boom is over. But it left as its legacy a sharp rise in Spanish costs and prices relative to the rest of the euro zone (the chart below is Spanish unit labor costs in manufacturing relative to the EZ average, but it doesn’t much matter which measure you use):

How does Spain get out of this? No devaluation is possible — and no, I don’t think exiting the euro is feasible. So it has to do it with relative deflation, hard enough in normal times, when at least costs and prices elsewhere are rising a few percent a year. In the face of a depressed and possibly deflationary European economy … this is going to be ugly.”

Why i say we are in the Depression Zone? And Thanks to the Bank it's a crisis; in the eurozone it's a total catastrophe

The Bank of England may have averted a catastrophe. If ever there was a time when England needed its own monetary authorities – acting with wartime urgency – this is the moment.

Those nations with fossilised or timid central banks clinging to outdated ideologies are not so lucky. Even less lucky are those such as Spain and Ireland that have surrendered policy to a body that is deaf to their pleas and constitutionally obliged to ignore the welfare of their particular societies. They face crucifixion.

Spain's agony is already well advanced. Industrial output has fallen 24pc. Some 352,000 people have lost their jobs in two months. BBVA expects unemployment to reach 20pc next year, touching 4.5m. Premier Jose Luis Zapatero can do nothing as long as Spain remains in monetary union.

He cannot devalue to claw back 30pc in lost labour competitiveness against EMU's German bloc, or take emergency steps to slow the property crash. In an odd lapse last week – perhaps a slip – he advised Spaniards that the best thing to do in these dark times was to ****.

Yes, it is dangerous for the Bank of England to buy up a third of all long-dated gilts. But it would be even more dangerous to allow deflation to run its course in an economy where debt levels have reached such extremes. Debt and deflation are a deadly mix.

The errors that led to our current predicament are well-known. A small army of economists – Austrians, Monetarists, and Keynesians – warned that central banks were playing with fire by fixing the price of credit too low and ignoring asset bubbles. The $6.7 trillion in reserve accumulation by China, Japan, and the petro-powers drove bond yields too low for safety.

Credit signals were gravely distorted. In Britain, Gordon Brown poured petrol on the fire by pushing the fiscal deficit to 3pc of GDP at the top of the cycle. Wretched man. However much we rage at Sir Fred or Citi-wrecker Chuck Prince, let us not forget that this crisis was confected by governments. To blame the free market is to miss the bigger point.

But I digress. We are now faced with the post-debt wreckage. The task at hand is to hold our societies together as best we can. One dreads to think what would have happened if the Hoover-Brüning nostalgics had succeeded in blocking every remedy.

As it is we have seen industrial production collapse in every region. The drops in January were: Japan (-31pc), Korea (-26pc), Russia (-16pc), Brazil (-15pc), Italy (-14pc), Germany (-12pc). Falls that took two years from late 1929 have been compressed into five months.

Those who say this is nothing like the Great Depression are complacent. Household debt is higher today, and UK banks are in worse shape. (No bank of size failed in the British Empire during the slump). Britain's economy contracted by 5.6pc from peak to trough in the early 1930s (Eichengreen). Some put the figure at nearer 8pc. We may surpass that this time.

America suffered worse. Real GDP fell 28pc. But the worst occurred in the second leg, after the heinous policy blunders of late 1931. Reading contemporary accounts, it is clear that hardly anybody – not even Keynes or Fisher – realised that the world was slipping into a depression during the first 18 months.

Nobel laureate Paul Krugman says the Fed has been as far behind the curve today as it was then, given the faster pace of collapse. It is bizarre that Ben Bernanke has not started to buy US Treasuries a full three months after he floated the idea, despite a yield rise of 80 basis points.

He has been stymied by the hawks. Kansas chief Thomas Hoenig said last week that the top priority is to drain liquidity before recovery later this year sets off inflation. Well, Mr Hoenig said last May that inflation psychology was gaining a hold "not seen since the 1970s and early 1980s" with a risk that inflation would become "embedded in the economy." The price spike broke within weeks. If his model was wrong then, why is it right now?

As for the ECB, it has not reached the starting line. Jean-Claude Trichet insists that there is no danger of deflation in Europe. What is the weather like on his planet, asked Mr Krugman.

The ECB has cut rates to 1.5pc, but since they need to be minus 1pc on the Taylor Rule, this leaves the breach as wide as ever. The Bundesbank is blocking any serious move towards quantitative easing.

Given that Germany's economy is imploding (Deutsche Bank sees 5pc contraction this year) one wonders if the Bundesbank would be less hawkish if the D-mark still existed. Even their hard-money brothers at Switzerland's SNB are cash printers these days.

So has monetary policy in euroland been paralysed by squabbles at a calamitous moment, blighting every member state? Almost certainly.

I'll take the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street any day, warts and all

 

please  feel free to leave your comments, your views and suggestions.

Do Changes in Stock Prices Causes Recession? And Why Stock Market do not Directly Affect the Economy?

The economy and the stock market are closely related. Many people examine the stock market to find out how the economy is doing. It's long been known that if the stock market is in a period of decline, the economy is sure to follow. However there is little evidence that the stock market causes the economy to rise or fall. The stock market does not directly affect the economy. “It is simply a mirror of people's generally correct beliefs about what is about to happen in the economy”. The best way to understand this is to realize that a stock market index the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) is simply a price. Because the value of index is a price, it only has two determinants: supply and demand.

Supply

Any first year college textbook in Economics states that for most goods if the supply increases in the short run then the price of the good should decline. For example, if the car companies suddenly doubled their supply of cars then we would expect the price of cars to fall.

If we thought that changes in the supply of stocks are the main cause of stock market rises and declines then, according to this rule, when a company issues new stock we would expect the price of stock to decline. If stock prices are largely determined by the supply of stocks and the market declines prior to an economic decline, we should see a flood of new stock issues before a recession. This does not happen in practice, as new stock issues tend to occur as the economy enters a growth period. This is because the money made from a stock issue is used to increase the output of the company, which causes economic growth to rise.

Demand

It appears that if we want to understand why the economy tends to move in the same direction as the stock market, we'll have to consider the demand for stocks. To do this, we'll need to understand what motivates an investors decision to buy or sell shares. Many investors such as Warren Buffett evaluate their stock portfolios on their inherent value. The inherent value is the total expected earnings of the company over a time period, discounted by the fact that a dollar today is not worth as much as a dollar tomorrow. If investors believe that a recession is coming, then they will believe that company earnings will be less in the future (since that typically takes place in a recession) which will decrease the inherent value of the stock. When the inherent value of the stock is far below its current price, investors will sell the stock, driving the price of the stock down. If investors believe a boom is coming, they will increase their estimates of the inherent value because future earnings should be higher than they previously expected. Often this will lead to the inherent value being far higher than the current price of the stock, so investors buy the stock. This leads the price of the stock to rise.

The belief that the stock market drives the economy is due to an error in logic. Generally we think that if A came before B that A caused B. Philosophers refer to this as the post hoc, propter hoc fallacy. In this case, the expectation of a decline in the economy causes the stock market to decline today. Or in logical terms, A came before B, because the expectation of B caused A. It's also important to realize that it's not the expectation of future economic changes that is causing changes in stock prices. It's the fact that people are acting on these expectations. If investors bought and sold stocks based on astrological factors or Barry Bonds'(baseball player) current homerun total then these would be causing the price of stocks to change. In a situation like that, it would seem that the stars are causing the price of stocks to change; the economy would have nothing to do with it.

It is because a large number of investors act on this inherent value principle that the economy tends to follow the stock market. Investors are constantly watching macroeconomic variables to try and determine when the next downturn in the economy will happen. Investors are often right when they predict the future growth rate of the economy. As a result, they often sell off their shares before the economy goes into a decline making it look like the stock market is causing a recession. In reality the causality runs the other way because the two things that causes price to change are changes in supply or changes in demand.

A sharp Decline in US imports & Exports

U.S. Imports and Exports Through December

The first graph shows the monthly U.S. exports and imports in dollars through December 2008. The recent rapid decline in foreign trade continued in December. Note that a large portion of the decline in imports is related to the fall in oil prices - but not all.

The graph includes both goods and services. The import and export of services has held up pretty well; most of the collapse in trade has been in goods. Imports of goods has declined by one third from the peak of last July!

 

The second graph shows the U.S. trade deficit, with and without petroleum, through January.

The blue line is the total deficit, and the black line is the petroleum deficit, and the red line is the trade deficit ex-petroleum products. 
Import oil prices fell to $39.81 in January, and import quantities decreased too - so the petroleum deficit declined by $4 billion. 
The trade deficit is now mostly China ($20.6 billion NSA in January) and oil.

A Sharp decline In U.S Import & Export

U.S. Imports and Exports Through December

The first graph shows the monthly U.S. exports and imports in dollars through December 2008. The recent rapid decline in foreign trade continued in December. Note that a large portion of the decline in imports is related to the fall in oil prices - but not all.

The graph includes both goods and services. The import and export of services has held up pretty well; most of the collapse in trade has been in goods. Imports of goods has declined by one third from the peak of last July!

The second graph shows the U.S. trade deficit, with and without petroleum, through January.

 

The blue line is the total deficit, and the black line is the petroleum deficit, and the red line is the trade deficit ex-petroleum products. 

Import oil prices fell to $39.81 in January, and import quantities decreased too - so the petroleum deficit declined by $4 billion. 

The trade deficit is now mostly China ($20.6 billion NSA in January) and oil.

Is It DEPRESSION?

 

You may have picked up on my change in terminology recently. I have gone from calling this rough patch in the global economy a rough patch, downturn, recession or some other euphemism to labeling it a Depression. Now, I am doing that for effect in part. Thinking of this as a longer-term downturn focuses one on mitigating downside risk rather than waiting for the eventual rebound. I think this is what we need to do.

However, I do believe it will be a depression in all likelihood — although we are not there yet with the data. What I find interesting is that a number of prominent figures have started to voice the same beliefs in public. David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch was the first. And even UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown let the D-word slip from his mouth. Bond King Bill Gross recently said it was a depression with a small 'd.' Now, we can add Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the mix

International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn said the world's advanced economies — the U.S., Western Europe and Japan — are "already in depression," and that the IMF could slash its global growth forecasts further. The "worst cannot be ruled out," he said.

The IMF managing director's comments to reporters after a speech in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, represent the most dire estimate thus far of the state of the global economy by a major political figure, and were far more pessimistic than forecasts released by the IMF as recently Jan. 28.

Political figures generally avoid using the word depression because of the association with the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment hit 25% in the U.S. and economic output fell even more steeply. Last week, when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown used the word "depression" to describe the global economy, his aides quickly said it was a slip of the tongue.

In the U.S., chief White House economic adviser Lawrence Summers said that while the economic situation was serious, it wasn't as bad as Mr. Strauss-Kahn seemed to suggest."We were really in a very different situation than" the Great Depression, he said on ABC television's "This Week with George Stephanopoulos." Since the events of the 1930s, there hasn't been a widely accepted definition of economic depression.

Former IMF Chief Economist Simon Johnson, a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management, said the term refers to a significant contraction that lasts around five years. Under that definition, he said, Japan during the 1990s could have been classified as having been trapped in a depression.

Whatever the definition, by using the word "depression," Mr. Strauss-Kahn, a 59-year-old former French finance minister who has worked for decades on economic issues, has achieved shock value. That could increase political pressure on national leaders on at least two fronts, Mr. Johnson and several IMF officials said.

The IMF has been campaigning for months to get governments in many countries to boost fiscal spending by about two percentage points to fight the global downturn. It has recently pressed governments again to repair their banking systems, even at a steep cost.

But it has been frustrated by what it feels is an inadequate response, especially in Europe, where governments worry that additional spending will lead to unmanageable inflation. U.S. plans have brought more applause by IMF officials.

The IMF also has also begun to campaign to double its lending war chest to $500 billion, from $250 billion. The declaration of a depression could help Mr. Strauss-Kahn pressure reluctant IMF board members to pitch in and fund that plan. The IMF is close to finalizing a deal with Japan for a $100 billion loan that could be tapped in emergencies, and plans to call on other countries with large reserves, such as China and Saudi Arabia, to make emergency loans available too.

In addition, the IMF is considering issuing bonds for the first time in its history. It's likely that such bonds would be sold only to governments or central banks; in that way, they would become part of those nations' official reserves. The holders of the bonds could sell them to other nations, though probably not on the open market. That would make the bonds a more liquid version of loans to the IMF.

Issuing bonds is seen as a more controversial measure by some IMF members, especially the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands, which prefer to keep the IMF on a tighter leash by limiting its ability to lend.

Apparently, Strauss-Kahn has the same perspective I have here: politicians are seriously underestimating how bad things could become if they continue along the present course of inaction and half measures. Chief amongst my worries are the lack of a comprehensive banking solution in the U.S., the U.K and Ireland, the lack of any meaningful stimulus in the Eurozone, and the increasingly protectionist rhetoric from multiple parties. These are deflationary and depressionary forces. Nevertheless, there are pitfalls on either side of this debate because monetary aggregates are rising at rapid rates, suggesting an underlying inflationary pressure that will explode once the economy gains traction

Why I say Central bank should cut Interest Rates around the world!!

Central banks around the world are whacking interest rates at a breakneck clip. The Fed, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and now the ECB and the BoE. The BoE made the most dramatic move with an outsized 150 basis point cut. However, I am not convinced this is what the market needs.

Why are central banks cutting interest rates?

The conventional wisdom is that cutting interest rates provides monetary stimulus. Cutting interest rates will help prop up the economy at a time when commodity prices are plummeting, making inflation less of a concern. I do believe this is true and some easing might be just what we need at this delicate point. However, I also believe cutting rates has unintended consequences — and one of them is increasing the appetite for risk.

Before I go into why this is so, let me explain how I see interest rates with a blurb from a previous post.

The purpose of interest rates

Consider money to be just like any other good. Therefore, a loan is essentially an exchange of a 'present good' (money that can be used today) for a 'future good' (an IOU -money that can be used later). Because people will always prefer having a good straight away than receiving that good later, the present good commands a premium in the marketplace. That premium is the rate of interest.

Interest rates, therefore, represent thetime value of money. It is the mechanism through which individuals express 'time-preferences' i.e., how much more they value receiving money right now as opposed to a later date. The premium of present money over future money fluctuates according to people's time preferences; if people want money today very badly, the premium for money today (interest rate) will be high.

So, the purpose of credit and interest rates is clear. It is the mechanism by which one is compensated for deferring consumption today for later consumption.

The business cycle

Loans on credit also create the boom-bust business cycle. In our fractional reserve deposit banking system, banks must keep on hand only a portion of the money we deposit. The rest is lent out as credit. Therefore, if all depositors were to rush to the bank to redeem their deposits, the bank would not have enough cash on hand and would be declared insolvent. This is what happens in a bank run. To avoid a run, banks must maintain the confidence of depositors by acting prudently and cautiously in extending credit. If not, they risk insolvency.

The problem is that human nature steps in; as the business cycle progresses, the banks lend more and more money. Naturally, some of those loans are 'bad' loans i.e., the debtor cannot pay back the full principal at the required time. The banks must account for these bad loans in their loan loss reserves.

However, at some point, when the credit cycle has progressed too far, one of two things occurs:

• The economy 'overheats' and inflation starts to rise. Whispers start circulating that the central bank will raise interest rates and that inflation is spiraling out of control. The central bank does increase interest rates and many loans that looked good in a lower interest rate environment start to go sour.
  
• Banks simply start lending to too many questionable debtors and more loans go bad than anticipated.
  

As rumors circulate that this bank or that bank has been lending imprudently, the banks dig in their heels and pull back. Interest rates go up, credit contracts, and the economy goes into recession.

This is the business cycle. It is a natural part of our capitalist system and it is entirely created by the extension of credit.

In my view, cutting interest rates below their natural level distorts time preferences and investment decisions, causing individuals and companies to take on more risk — risk that they will later regret having taken. In effect, the central bank is goading people into misconstruing the riskiness of the decisions they are making by keeping interest rates artificially low.

A perfect example is the previous housing bubble. If interest rates should be 5% but they are 1%, then home builders are going to increase their indebtedness to take on more projects with longer and longer completion time frames. A project that comes online 5 years out looks much less risky when you can borrow money for 4 or 5% less.

Another example of this right now comes in the form of levered ETFs. These are exchange traded funds that allow investors speculators the opportunity to double or triple the gains from investing in the stock market. SeePaul Kedrosky's take on this here.

While gains are levered, so are losses and it seems amazing to me that investors are taking on that much risk after the drubbing we all took in October. But, when interest rates are cut to 1%, that is what happens.

Why don't central banks leave interest rates alone but lend freely against good collateral? Intervene in the commercial paper market if you must, but stop distorting investment decisions. The only reason that rate are being cut so low is political pressure, plain and simple.

And when politics drives economic and monetary policy, bad things happen.