Spanish doldrums – Paul Krugman

This is an article written by Paul Krugman which i felt is necessary to share. So read through this and leave your comments.

“I’m in Yurp for a week, spending some time on other peoples’ problems (although in a way it’s all part of the same problem.) And one has to say that Europe has gotten itself into one heck of a mess, worse even than ours — because they have intractable adjustment problems on top of the general crisis.

The poster child for these adjustment problems is Spain, where I’m currently sitting.

For much of the past decade, Spain had a huge construction boom, financed by vast inflows of capital:

Now that boom is over. But it left as its legacy a sharp rise in Spanish costs and prices relative to the rest of the euro zone (the chart below is Spanish unit labor costs in manufacturing relative to the EZ average, but it doesn’t much matter which measure you use):

How does Spain get out of this? No devaluation is possible — and no, I don’t think exiting the euro is feasible. So it has to do it with relative deflation, hard enough in normal times, when at least costs and prices elsewhere are rising a few percent a year. In the face of a depressed and possibly deflationary European economy … this is going to be ugly.”

Why i say we are in the Depression Zone? And Thanks to the Bank it's a crisis; in the eurozone it's a total catastrophe

The Bank of England may have averted a catastrophe. If ever there was a time when England needed its own monetary authorities – acting with wartime urgency – this is the moment.

Those nations with fossilised or timid central banks clinging to outdated ideologies are not so lucky. Even less lucky are those such as Spain and Ireland that have surrendered policy to a body that is deaf to their pleas and constitutionally obliged to ignore the welfare of their particular societies. They face crucifixion.

Spain's agony is already well advanced. Industrial output has fallen 24pc. Some 352,000 people have lost their jobs in two months. BBVA expects unemployment to reach 20pc next year, touching 4.5m. Premier Jose Luis Zapatero can do nothing as long as Spain remains in monetary union.

He cannot devalue to claw back 30pc in lost labour competitiveness against EMU's German bloc, or take emergency steps to slow the property crash. In an odd lapse last week – perhaps a slip – he advised Spaniards that the best thing to do in these dark times was to ****.

Yes, it is dangerous for the Bank of England to buy up a third of all long-dated gilts. But it would be even more dangerous to allow deflation to run its course in an economy where debt levels have reached such extremes. Debt and deflation are a deadly mix.

The errors that led to our current predicament are well-known. A small army of economists – Austrians, Monetarists, and Keynesians – warned that central banks were playing with fire by fixing the price of credit too low and ignoring asset bubbles. The $6.7 trillion in reserve accumulation by China, Japan, and the petro-powers drove bond yields too low for safety.

Credit signals were gravely distorted. In Britain, Gordon Brown poured petrol on the fire by pushing the fiscal deficit to 3pc of GDP at the top of the cycle. Wretched man. However much we rage at Sir Fred or Citi-wrecker Chuck Prince, let us not forget that this crisis was confected by governments. To blame the free market is to miss the bigger point.

But I digress. We are now faced with the post-debt wreckage. The task at hand is to hold our societies together as best we can. One dreads to think what would have happened if the Hoover-Brüning nostalgics had succeeded in blocking every remedy.

As it is we have seen industrial production collapse in every region. The drops in January were: Japan (-31pc), Korea (-26pc), Russia (-16pc), Brazil (-15pc), Italy (-14pc), Germany (-12pc). Falls that took two years from late 1929 have been compressed into five months.

Those who say this is nothing like the Great Depression are complacent. Household debt is higher today, and UK banks are in worse shape. (No bank of size failed in the British Empire during the slump). Britain's economy contracted by 5.6pc from peak to trough in the early 1930s (Eichengreen). Some put the figure at nearer 8pc. We may surpass that this time.

America suffered worse. Real GDP fell 28pc. But the worst occurred in the second leg, after the heinous policy blunders of late 1931. Reading contemporary accounts, it is clear that hardly anybody – not even Keynes or Fisher – realised that the world was slipping into a depression during the first 18 months.

Nobel laureate Paul Krugman says the Fed has been as far behind the curve today as it was then, given the faster pace of collapse. It is bizarre that Ben Bernanke has not started to buy US Treasuries a full three months after he floated the idea, despite a yield rise of 80 basis points.

He has been stymied by the hawks. Kansas chief Thomas Hoenig said last week that the top priority is to drain liquidity before recovery later this year sets off inflation. Well, Mr Hoenig said last May that inflation psychology was gaining a hold "not seen since the 1970s and early 1980s" with a risk that inflation would become "embedded in the economy." The price spike broke within weeks. If his model was wrong then, why is it right now?

As for the ECB, it has not reached the starting line. Jean-Claude Trichet insists that there is no danger of deflation in Europe. What is the weather like on his planet, asked Mr Krugman.

The ECB has cut rates to 1.5pc, but since they need to be minus 1pc on the Taylor Rule, this leaves the breach as wide as ever. The Bundesbank is blocking any serious move towards quantitative easing.

Given that Germany's economy is imploding (Deutsche Bank sees 5pc contraction this year) one wonders if the Bundesbank would be less hawkish if the D-mark still existed. Even their hard-money brothers at Switzerland's SNB are cash printers these days.

So has monetary policy in euroland been paralysed by squabbles at a calamitous moment, blighting every member state? Almost certainly.

I'll take the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street any day, warts and all

 

please  feel free to leave your comments, your views and suggestions.

Do Changes in Stock Prices Causes Recession? And Why Stock Market do not Directly Affect the Economy?

The economy and the stock market are closely related. Many people examine the stock market to find out how the economy is doing. It's long been known that if the stock market is in a period of decline, the economy is sure to follow. However there is little evidence that the stock market causes the economy to rise or fall. The stock market does not directly affect the economy. “It is simply a mirror of people's generally correct beliefs about what is about to happen in the economy”. The best way to understand this is to realize that a stock market index the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) is simply a price. Because the value of index is a price, it only has two determinants: supply and demand.

Supply

Any first year college textbook in Economics states that for most goods if the supply increases in the short run then the price of the good should decline. For example, if the car companies suddenly doubled their supply of cars then we would expect the price of cars to fall.

If we thought that changes in the supply of stocks are the main cause of stock market rises and declines then, according to this rule, when a company issues new stock we would expect the price of stock to decline. If stock prices are largely determined by the supply of stocks and the market declines prior to an economic decline, we should see a flood of new stock issues before a recession. This does not happen in practice, as new stock issues tend to occur as the economy enters a growth period. This is because the money made from a stock issue is used to increase the output of the company, which causes economic growth to rise.

Demand

It appears that if we want to understand why the economy tends to move in the same direction as the stock market, we'll have to consider the demand for stocks. To do this, we'll need to understand what motivates an investors decision to buy or sell shares. Many investors such as Warren Buffett evaluate their stock portfolios on their inherent value. The inherent value is the total expected earnings of the company over a time period, discounted by the fact that a dollar today is not worth as much as a dollar tomorrow. If investors believe that a recession is coming, then they will believe that company earnings will be less in the future (since that typically takes place in a recession) which will decrease the inherent value of the stock. When the inherent value of the stock is far below its current price, investors will sell the stock, driving the price of the stock down. If investors believe a boom is coming, they will increase their estimates of the inherent value because future earnings should be higher than they previously expected. Often this will lead to the inherent value being far higher than the current price of the stock, so investors buy the stock. This leads the price of the stock to rise.

The belief that the stock market drives the economy is due to an error in logic. Generally we think that if A came before B that A caused B. Philosophers refer to this as the post hoc, propter hoc fallacy. In this case, the expectation of a decline in the economy causes the stock market to decline today. Or in logical terms, A came before B, because the expectation of B caused A. It's also important to realize that it's not the expectation of future economic changes that is causing changes in stock prices. It's the fact that people are acting on these expectations. If investors bought and sold stocks based on astrological factors or Barry Bonds'(baseball player) current homerun total then these would be causing the price of stocks to change. In a situation like that, it would seem that the stars are causing the price of stocks to change; the economy would have nothing to do with it.

It is because a large number of investors act on this inherent value principle that the economy tends to follow the stock market. Investors are constantly watching macroeconomic variables to try and determine when the next downturn in the economy will happen. Investors are often right when they predict the future growth rate of the economy. As a result, they often sell off their shares before the economy goes into a decline making it look like the stock market is causing a recession. In reality the causality runs the other way because the two things that causes price to change are changes in supply or changes in demand.

A sharp Decline in US imports & Exports

U.S. Imports and Exports Through December

The first graph shows the monthly U.S. exports and imports in dollars through December 2008. The recent rapid decline in foreign trade continued in December. Note that a large portion of the decline in imports is related to the fall in oil prices - but not all.

The graph includes both goods and services. The import and export of services has held up pretty well; most of the collapse in trade has been in goods. Imports of goods has declined by one third from the peak of last July!

 

The second graph shows the U.S. trade deficit, with and without petroleum, through January.

The blue line is the total deficit, and the black line is the petroleum deficit, and the red line is the trade deficit ex-petroleum products. 
Import oil prices fell to $39.81 in January, and import quantities decreased too - so the petroleum deficit declined by $4 billion. 
The trade deficit is now mostly China ($20.6 billion NSA in January) and oil.

A Sharp decline In U.S Import & Export

U.S. Imports and Exports Through December

The first graph shows the monthly U.S. exports and imports in dollars through December 2008. The recent rapid decline in foreign trade continued in December. Note that a large portion of the decline in imports is related to the fall in oil prices - but not all.

The graph includes both goods and services. The import and export of services has held up pretty well; most of the collapse in trade has been in goods. Imports of goods has declined by one third from the peak of last July!

The second graph shows the U.S. trade deficit, with and without petroleum, through January.

 

The blue line is the total deficit, and the black line is the petroleum deficit, and the red line is the trade deficit ex-petroleum products. 

Import oil prices fell to $39.81 in January, and import quantities decreased too - so the petroleum deficit declined by $4 billion. 

The trade deficit is now mostly China ($20.6 billion NSA in January) and oil.

Is It DEPRESSION?

 

You may have picked up on my change in terminology recently. I have gone from calling this rough patch in the global economy a rough patch, downturn, recession or some other euphemism to labeling it a Depression. Now, I am doing that for effect in part. Thinking of this as a longer-term downturn focuses one on mitigating downside risk rather than waiting for the eventual rebound. I think this is what we need to do.

However, I do believe it will be a depression in all likelihood — although we are not there yet with the data. What I find interesting is that a number of prominent figures have started to voice the same beliefs in public. David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch was the first. And even UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown let the D-word slip from his mouth. Bond King Bill Gross recently said it was a depression with a small 'd.' Now, we can add Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the mix

International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn said the world's advanced economies — the U.S., Western Europe and Japan — are "already in depression," and that the IMF could slash its global growth forecasts further. The "worst cannot be ruled out," he said.

The IMF managing director's comments to reporters after a speech in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, represent the most dire estimate thus far of the state of the global economy by a major political figure, and were far more pessimistic than forecasts released by the IMF as recently Jan. 28.

Political figures generally avoid using the word depression because of the association with the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment hit 25% in the U.S. and economic output fell even more steeply. Last week, when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown used the word "depression" to describe the global economy, his aides quickly said it was a slip of the tongue.

In the U.S., chief White House economic adviser Lawrence Summers said that while the economic situation was serious, it wasn't as bad as Mr. Strauss-Kahn seemed to suggest."We were really in a very different situation than" the Great Depression, he said on ABC television's "This Week with George Stephanopoulos." Since the events of the 1930s, there hasn't been a widely accepted definition of economic depression.

Former IMF Chief Economist Simon Johnson, a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management, said the term refers to a significant contraction that lasts around five years. Under that definition, he said, Japan during the 1990s could have been classified as having been trapped in a depression.

Whatever the definition, by using the word "depression," Mr. Strauss-Kahn, a 59-year-old former French finance minister who has worked for decades on economic issues, has achieved shock value. That could increase political pressure on national leaders on at least two fronts, Mr. Johnson and several IMF officials said.

The IMF has been campaigning for months to get governments in many countries to boost fiscal spending by about two percentage points to fight the global downturn. It has recently pressed governments again to repair their banking systems, even at a steep cost.

But it has been frustrated by what it feels is an inadequate response, especially in Europe, where governments worry that additional spending will lead to unmanageable inflation. U.S. plans have brought more applause by IMF officials.

The IMF also has also begun to campaign to double its lending war chest to $500 billion, from $250 billion. The declaration of a depression could help Mr. Strauss-Kahn pressure reluctant IMF board members to pitch in and fund that plan. The IMF is close to finalizing a deal with Japan for a $100 billion loan that could be tapped in emergencies, and plans to call on other countries with large reserves, such as China and Saudi Arabia, to make emergency loans available too.

In addition, the IMF is considering issuing bonds for the first time in its history. It's likely that such bonds would be sold only to governments or central banks; in that way, they would become part of those nations' official reserves. The holders of the bonds could sell them to other nations, though probably not on the open market. That would make the bonds a more liquid version of loans to the IMF.

Issuing bonds is seen as a more controversial measure by some IMF members, especially the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands, which prefer to keep the IMF on a tighter leash by limiting its ability to lend.

Apparently, Strauss-Kahn has the same perspective I have here: politicians are seriously underestimating how bad things could become if they continue along the present course of inaction and half measures. Chief amongst my worries are the lack of a comprehensive banking solution in the U.S., the U.K and Ireland, the lack of any meaningful stimulus in the Eurozone, and the increasingly protectionist rhetoric from multiple parties. These are deflationary and depressionary forces. Nevertheless, there are pitfalls on either side of this debate because monetary aggregates are rising at rapid rates, suggesting an underlying inflationary pressure that will explode once the economy gains traction

Why I say Central bank should cut Interest Rates around the world!!

Central banks around the world are whacking interest rates at a breakneck clip. The Fed, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and now the ECB and the BoE. The BoE made the most dramatic move with an outsized 150 basis point cut. However, I am not convinced this is what the market needs.

Why are central banks cutting interest rates?

The conventional wisdom is that cutting interest rates provides monetary stimulus. Cutting interest rates will help prop up the economy at a time when commodity prices are plummeting, making inflation less of a concern. I do believe this is true and some easing might be just what we need at this delicate point. However, I also believe cutting rates has unintended consequences — and one of them is increasing the appetite for risk.

Before I go into why this is so, let me explain how I see interest rates with a blurb from a previous post.

The purpose of interest rates

Consider money to be just like any other good. Therefore, a loan is essentially an exchange of a 'present good' (money that can be used today) for a 'future good' (an IOU -money that can be used later). Because people will always prefer having a good straight away than receiving that good later, the present good commands a premium in the marketplace. That premium is the rate of interest.

Interest rates, therefore, represent thetime value of money. It is the mechanism through which individuals express 'time-preferences' i.e., how much more they value receiving money right now as opposed to a later date. The premium of present money over future money fluctuates according to people's time preferences; if people want money today very badly, the premium for money today (interest rate) will be high.

So, the purpose of credit and interest rates is clear. It is the mechanism by which one is compensated for deferring consumption today for later consumption.

The business cycle

Loans on credit also create the boom-bust business cycle. In our fractional reserve deposit banking system, banks must keep on hand only a portion of the money we deposit. The rest is lent out as credit. Therefore, if all depositors were to rush to the bank to redeem their deposits, the bank would not have enough cash on hand and would be declared insolvent. This is what happens in a bank run. To avoid a run, banks must maintain the confidence of depositors by acting prudently and cautiously in extending credit. If not, they risk insolvency.

The problem is that human nature steps in; as the business cycle progresses, the banks lend more and more money. Naturally, some of those loans are 'bad' loans i.e., the debtor cannot pay back the full principal at the required time. The banks must account for these bad loans in their loan loss reserves.

However, at some point, when the credit cycle has progressed too far, one of two things occurs:

• The economy 'overheats' and inflation starts to rise. Whispers start circulating that the central bank will raise interest rates and that inflation is spiraling out of control. The central bank does increase interest rates and many loans that looked good in a lower interest rate environment start to go sour.
  
• Banks simply start lending to too many questionable debtors and more loans go bad than anticipated.
  

As rumors circulate that this bank or that bank has been lending imprudently, the banks dig in their heels and pull back. Interest rates go up, credit contracts, and the economy goes into recession.

This is the business cycle. It is a natural part of our capitalist system and it is entirely created by the extension of credit.

In my view, cutting interest rates below their natural level distorts time preferences and investment decisions, causing individuals and companies to take on more risk — risk that they will later regret having taken. In effect, the central bank is goading people into misconstruing the riskiness of the decisions they are making by keeping interest rates artificially low.

A perfect example is the previous housing bubble. If interest rates should be 5% but they are 1%, then home builders are going to increase their indebtedness to take on more projects with longer and longer completion time frames. A project that comes online 5 years out looks much less risky when you can borrow money for 4 or 5% less.

Another example of this right now comes in the form of levered ETFs. These are exchange traded funds that allow investors speculators the opportunity to double or triple the gains from investing in the stock market. SeePaul Kedrosky's take on this here.

While gains are levered, so are losses and it seems amazing to me that investors are taking on that much risk after the drubbing we all took in October. But, when interest rates are cut to 1%, that is what happens.

Why don't central banks leave interest rates alone but lend freely against good collateral? Intervene in the commercial paper market if you must, but stop distorting investment decisions. The only reason that rate are being cut so low is political pressure, plain and simple.

And when politics drives economic and monetary policy, bad things happen.

 

China's Stimulus Plan Will Change the World

Brazil's President Lula told his country in September, "People ask me about the [financial] crisis, and I answer, go ask Bush. It is his crisis, not mine."

Fifty days later, British Treasury Secretary Stephen Timms told a conference of G-20 nations gathered in Sao Paulo, Brazil: "We are in extraordinary times, the global economy is facing shocks which are wholly without precedent and we need a new approach. … It is a global crisis. It therefore requires an international response."

In other words, what goes around, comes around. Global schadenfreude toward a stupid and greedy United States and its subprime mortgage meltdown has rapidly become global concern about how to rescue the world from an all-encompassing financial disaster. Here's just a smattering of companies large and small that recently announced lowered outlooks for the year: Under Armour (NYSE: UA), News Corp. (NYSE: NWS), Starbucks (Nasdaq: SBUX), Vodafone (NYSE: VOD), Electronic Arts (Nasdaq: ERTS), ADP (NYSE: ADP), and Hormel (NYSE: HRL). (Yes, in these tough times, even the outlook for Spam is grim.)

And if that were not enough, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently lowered its outlook for the entire global economy.

One country's plan to step up
Against that backdrop, China announced a 4-trillion-yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package for its domestic economy this past Sunday. It plans to fund extensive infrastructure construction, aid poor farmers, and cut export taxes.

While China's plan has clear beneficiaries, and should help keep more laborers in their jobs and prop up domestic consumer spending, the most important (and underreported) aspect of the plan is how it will fundamentally change the economic relationship between the U.S. and China.

Here's how it was
One of the big debates over the past half-decade was whether China had reached a point in its economic development at which its internal economic gravity would allow it to "decouple" from the global economy. If so, it could continue along its fantastic growth trajectory, even as growth in the U.S. or Europe ceased or reversed.

That may sound like gobbledygook, but it's important. The U.S. has a $20 billion monthly trade deficit with China. It's funded by China's willingness to hold U.S. treasuries in its Central Bank (essentially, we're borrowing the money). China manages the arrangement by pegging its currency (the yuan) to the dollar at an artificially low rate, and by not worrying so much about certain niceties like environmental regulation and labor protection.

It's a mutually beneficial arrangement -- a weak yuan supports Chinese exporters, helping the country industrialize and quickly integrate rural migrants into its urban workforce, with the salutary effect of keeping inflation and potential political unrest low. For its part, the U.S. has gotten dirt cheap financing, by virtue of China parking more than a trillion dollars in U.S. government securities. That has supported the dollar and allowed the Federal Reserve to fuel consumer spending by keeping interest rates low.

China's stimulus package heralds the unwinding of this relationship.

Here's how it will be
This is why the decoupling argument matters. Many analysts have pointed to the thousands of factories that have shut down in China in these past few months as evidence that a slowdown in American spending will cause a depression in China -- potentially even leading to regime change. But in fact, US trade imbalance with China is artificially preserved by the aforementioned currency peg, and by the decision of China's state-run banks to make uneconomic loans to businesses it deemed worth propping up.

China has paid heavily for this relationship. Rather than invest its surplus cash in its own country, the Chinese poured money back into the U.S. to further spur our debt-fueled consumption. (Put less artfully, some poor Chinese guy in Shaanxi province was essentially helping you pay your mortgage.)

The announced stimulus package reverses that. Hundreds of billions of dollars that would have gone to propping up the greenback are now being reinvested in China, helping it to transition from its reliance on exports to a self-sustaining economy. So while China isn't yet decoupled from its export markets, this new spending plan will help it along that path.

What you need to do to survive
China's huge currency reserves are about to be put to use, and while there will be some real and perhaps severe bumps along the way, the China that comes out on the other side will be a heck of a lot stronger, more independent, and more decoupled than the one we've seen up to now.

Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called his country's stimulus the "biggest contribution to the world." We don't know whether that's true, but we do know that China's ability to reach deep into its huge coffers to finance further growth gives it a significant advantage over the rest of the world's struggling economies.